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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 12-1749 
_________ 
 
 
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DUANE GREEN, 
                                   Appellant 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00186-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gustave Diamond 
 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 
December 18, 2012 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and VANASKIE, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Filed: December 20, 2012)  
 
__________             
 
OPINION 
__________ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Duane R. Green (“Green”) appeals his convictions and sentence for possession 
with intent to distribute, and distribution of, crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C).  Green contends that the District Court erred in denying his 
Motion to Dismiss for Constitutionally Infirm Grand Jury Selection.  We will affirm the 
convictions and judgment of sentence.1
I. 
 
 
Green, who is African-American, was indicted by a grand jury in the Pittsburgh 
Division of the Western District of Pennsylvania in September of 2010.  According to 
Green, the grand jury contained no African-Americans.  In the subsequent criminal 
proceedings, Green filed a Motion to Dismiss for Constitutionally Infirm Grand Jury 
Selection.  He argued that the system for empanelling grand juries in the Western 
District, which draws from registered voter lists, excluded potential African-American 
jurors in violation of equal protection and of his right to a grand jury drawn from a fair 
cross-section of the community.2
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
  In support, he submitted a report prepared by Project 
Vote documenting that African-Americans comprised nine percent of Pennsylvania’s 
population but only seven percent of its registered voters between 2002 and 2006.  He 
 
2 The Western District selects grand jurors pursuant to the “Plan of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for the Random Selection of 
Grand and Petit Jurors,” App. at 48, which was developed and approved as required by 
the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.  
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also submitted census data showing that African-Americans comprised approximately 
seven percent of the population of the Pittsburgh Division between 2005 and 2009.  
The District Court, in a careful opinion, concluded that Green did not establish 
either a prima facie equal protection claim or a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement.  The District Court therefore denied the motion.  Green ultimately 
pled guilty but reserved a limited right of appeal.  He now challenges the District Court’s 
denial of his Motion to Dismiss.  “We review the District Court's findings of fact for clear 
error, and its legal conclusions de novo.”  United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 235 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
II. 
On appeal, Green revives his equal protection claim.  Racial discrimination in the 
selection of grand jurors “strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our 
society as a whole,” and violates the guarantee of equal protection.  Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
U.S. 545, 556 (1979).3
Green has provided no evidence of intentional discrimination.  We agree with the 
District Court that he has also failed to establish “that African-Americans have been 
  To make a prima facie case, a defendant must either provide 
evidence of intentional discrimination or prove that (1) a constitutionally cognizable 
group (2) was substantially underrepresented among grand jurors “over a significant 
period of time” and (3) that the selection procedure was at least “susceptible of abuse” or 
“not racially neutral.”  Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).   
                                              
3 A violation of equal protection by the federal government offends the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  
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substantially underrepresented on grand juries in the Pittsburgh Division over a 
significant period of time.”  App. at 10.  The absence of African-Americans on Green’s 
own grand jury does not demonstrate either intentional discrimination or systematic 
underrepresentation, and so is immaterial; the Constitution affords no right to a particular 
jury composition.  See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).  Green’s statistics 
show that African-Americans are underrepresented on statewide voter lists (by reference 
to the state’s population), but they tell us nothing about the relative representation of 
African-Americans on the voter lists of the Pittsburgh Division.4
Green’s appeal also alludes to his “right to have a grand jury drawn from a fair 
cross section of the community.”  Appellant’s Br. at 12.  “The Sixth Amendment secures 
to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources 
reflecting a fair cross section of the community.”  Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 
1387 (2010).  We have applied the right to state grand juries as well.  See Ramseur v. 
Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1229-31 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  Whether it extends to federal 
  As the District Court 
concluded, Green “has not come close to producing the type of statistical evidence” that 
might demonstrate substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time.  
App. at 11.  Nor has he shown that the jury selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or 
is not racially neutral.  The District Court properly found that Green fell short of making 
a prima facie equal protection claim. 
                                              
4 Cf. United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2001) (defendant’s 
demographics expert “compared the number of African-Americans and Hispanics in the 
adult population of . . . the Erie Division to the number of African-Americans and 
Hispanics represented in the master wheels used in the Erie Division since 1995”). 
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grand juries is unclear.5  We need not resolve the issue, however, because for purposes of 
raising issues on appeal “a passing reference . . . will not suffice.”  Laborers' Int'l Union 
of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).  To the extent that 
Green intended to assert a violation of a Fifth or Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section 
right, we deem it waived.  Even if it were not, and assuming arguendo that the fair-cross-
section right extends to federal grand juries, Green’s evidence cannot clear the prima 
facie threshold of showing that African-Americans are “not fairly and reasonably 
represented in jury venires” in the Pittsburgh Division because of “‘systematic 
exclusion’” in the selection process.  Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 1392 (quoting Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).6
We agree with the analysis of the District Court, and will affirm.  
  As the District Court held, Green “has produced 
no evidence showing that African-Americans are systematically excluded from serving 
on grand juries in the Pittsburgh Division, let alone on a recurring basis.”  App. at 9. 
                                              
5 Green suggests, and the District Court asserted, that the Fifth Amendment right to 
indictment by grand jury includes the right to a grand jury drawn from a fair cross-section 
of the community.  Although Justice Powell once wrote in dissent that “[t]he right to a 
‘representative’ grand jury is a federal right that derives . . . from the Fifth Amendment's 
explicit requirement of a grand jury,” Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 509-10 (1977) 
(Powell, J., dissenting), neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court of appeals has 
since recognized this right.   
 
6 We note, furthermore, that we have previously upheld the Western District’s jury 
selection plan against a Sixth Amendment challenge, see Weaver, 267 F.3d at 240-244, 
and have also upheld reliance on voter and motor vehicle records as juror source lists.  
Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  Green presents no grounds on 
which to distinguish his case.  
